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(RE)COMPLEXIONING A SIMPLE TALE: RACE, SPEECH, AND
COLORED LEADERSHIP
ANGELA MAE KUPENDA*
INTRODUCTION
In the initial plenary session of LatCrit XVI, several speakers
discussed the borderlands and the desolation in these areas. The
borderlands have expanded as negative reactions to the increasing
number of people of color seeking access to both the geographical
spaces of what is America and the power spaces of who is America.
Increases of colored people include voting citizens of color with their
assertions of political voice and power, pose a threat to the past
dominant whiter, ruling complexion of America.
As America's complexion naturally darkens and the potential
impact of this darkening is noted, the borderlands become locations
for some White, tenuously privileged citizens, to push back against
this natural coloring of what it means to be an American. This struggle
ensues to prevent the darkening or the natural coloring of America's
complexion. Even the law has played a role in this pushback, as a
bleaching agent of sorts to whiten the law, especially after the law
shifts to follow the natural darkening of America's color.
This Essay argues for a different role for the law. Rather than
acting as a whitening agent, the law should reflect the natural
(re)complexioning of society and adapt to the melting pot that is
America. The term "(re)complexioning" is used because the idea that
the complexion of America was white at the beginning is false. Prior
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. I want to thank my
home institution for the scholarship grants, pre and post publication, that support
faculty work. I also want to thank LatCrit and the participants at the conference who
gave very helpful feedback on my presentation. LatCrit provides a community
where we can explore ideas, plan activism, and be encouraged in our advocacy in a
safe and collegial environment. An earlier draft of this article was also included for
presentation at the Association for African American Historical Research and
Preservation 2011 Black History Conference in Seattle, Washington.
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to the "discovery" of America, native citizens were indeed more
deeply complexioned than Whites. Any (re)complexioning of the law
since, to reflect the colors of America, then, is just to resort to the
recognition of factual premises unjustly rejected when America was
usurped from those of color and denied to others of color after they
themselves were usurped from their homelands.
To explain the necessary (re)complexioning of the law urged here,
this Essay will be divided into three parts. Part I summarizes the law
as a bleaching agent. Part II briefly summarizes the role of the law for
(re)complexioning. Finally, Part III examines the unique application
of this (re)complexioning in First Amendment jurisprudence as is
urged in this Essay.
I. THE LAW AS A BLEACHING AGENT
Following the initial LatCrit plenary, one attendee during the
question and comment session emphasized that borderlands of
pushback exist in many places, even as conflicts in many minds,
including in legal minds. Unfortunately, these borderlands exist even
in the law, and they lead to movements that bleach legal principles so
they will continue to uphold the dominant, Whiter culture as described
many years ago in the Plessy v. Ferguson dissent.'
Justice Harlan, though dissenting from the Court's insistence on
the constitutionality of separate and equal racial spaces, acknowledged
the white complexion of America for its posterity. He stated:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in
wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all
time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty.2
Justin Harlan contemplated the White race would remain the dominant
race, in a predominantly White America. So far, Justice Harlan has
unfortunately been correct. This dominance, though, is now in
question as Whites are projected to be a numerical racial minority in
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
400 [Vol. 48
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 48 [2011], No. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol48/iss2/9
(RE)COMPLEXIONING A SIMPLE TALE
the coming years.3 The numerical population shift could be
momentous, especially given the legal principle of "one person one
vote."4 This principle, in the 2008 presidential election, led the face of
America to darken in complexion.5 Thus, White dominance was and
will continue to be threatened, and Justice Harlan's predictions "for all
time," as he asserted, seem less likely to prevail.
Though threatened, White dominance as a structural institution
does not retreat without a struggle. The struggle occurs in the form of
a pushback in the borderlands. The borderlands are not just
geographical locations; similar effects can be seen in the laws in
America. This pushback can lead to an artificial form of bleaching to
whiten the law. Artificial whitening of the law is a bleaching of the
law to maintain White supremacy. Whitening with an artificial
bleaching agent is counterproductive to the progress of our nation,
especially a nation built on principles of being a melting pot and
promoting the value of the individual. This bleaching is a pushback
against natural societal coloring or progressions, and leads to
desolation and violence in the forced borderlands.
Whiteness as structural dominance has been maintained
artificially through the bleaching of the law. In Johnson v. McIntosh,6
the law expressly favored whiteness over the native complexions of
the land. Then in Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 the law declined to
recognize even free Blacks as citizens. In Korematsu v. U.S., 8 the law
3. "Some commentators anticipate a new melting pot, often labeled as 'the
browning of America'. . . . [The] Census Bureau [projects that] . . . non-Hispanic
Whites will no longer be the majority of the population in 2042." Anthony Daniel
Perez & Charles Hirschman, The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the
US.Population: Emerging American Identities, 35 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1, 1
(2009).
4. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 381 (1963)).
5. "[T]he president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations." Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity
as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 911, 952 (2011) (quoting
John Marshall's address before the House of Representatives, delivered in 1800).
Hence, the face of America, at least in the area of foreign relations, became more
deeply complexioned in 2008.
6. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
7. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
8. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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favored the appearance of security for Whites over the constitutional
interests of darker complexions. Even the sole dissent, arguing in
Plessy v. Ferguson, against the legitimization of separate and unequal
as a legal principle, stressed the dominance of whiteness in the
complexion of the power of America.9
Just as the law has a dominant complexion of whiteness, at other
times the march toward equality in America leads to a grassroots or
societal induced (re)complexioning of the law. It is unfortunate that it
is then that the law itself pushes back even more stringently, in this
legal borderland, to maintain a whiter, bleached complexion of the law
and its structure.
An example is seen in race and the public school system where
the law foraged further given the momentum of the civil rights
movement with the marches and protests. In Brown J,10 Brown II,1
and Cooper v. Aaron,12 the legal complexion browned as the schools
and other areas desegregated. After the law supported progress and
acknowledgment of the racial marches toward progress in America,
the law again whitened to persuade us that what existed did not really
exist. For example, San Antonio v. Rodriquez,'3 sanctioned unequal
distribution of educational funds, and Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,14 thwarted a district's own
initiative to provide more culturally diverse education for its children.
After struggles for racial hiring, justice bore fruit" and sanctioned
affirmative action. Affirmative action brought some relief to those
generationally denied jobs based on their color. However, the
complexion of the law artificially whitened again in response to this
societal coloring and push. The law whitened again with City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,1 6 and Hopwood v. Texas,17 which defied
9. 163 U.S. at 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
12. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
13. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
15. See, e.g., EMILYE CROSBY, A LITTLE TASTE OF FREEDOM: THE BLACK
FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN CLAIBORNE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 118-27 (Waldo E. Martin,
Jr., & Patricia Sullivan eds., 2005) (describing the grassroots battle waged in Port
Gibson, Mississippi).
16. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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the more complexioned earlier holding of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.'8 Grutter v. Bollinger was another move toward
equity and a browner complexion of the law. There, military advisers
and corporations argued that as a matter of fact a legal
(re)complexioning was necessary for the good of the country and for
national defense. 19 But the law bleached white again with the
pushback in Gratz v. Bollinger.20
So, we in America remain in the legal borderlands, as if in fear
that the complexion of our society and of the law may not be as white
as has been insisted is the purest form for generations. It is as if the
legal system has served as a bleaching cream: casting out
nonwhiteness by seeking to curtail birthright citizenship as to some
groups, limiting the teaching in schools of civil rights stories as to
other groups, and removing other colors from active participation in
the political structures through disenfranchisement.
This form of artificial whitening, like a bleaching cream,2 1 is an
artificial attempt to resist the simple coloring of, or simple
acknowledgement of the color in, and of, America. But, people of
color who have tried bleaching cream on their own faces to become
whiter and, maybe more acceptable if they bore lighter complexions,
can tell us that the use of bleaching creams to maintain whiteness is
futile.
As a Black teenager attending a very White school22 in a society
where dark skin on an innocent Black girl made her less attractive to
some, I used bleaching creams on my beautiful, dark brown skin
trying to make it more acceptable. After nightly applications of the
bleaching cream, my flawless, dark brown skin first became splotchy
with odd patches of paleness, and then became lighter brown skin. I
unashamedly celebrated my lighter complexion in my tenth grade
school pictures.23 But bleaching agents are temporary, the sun's
17. 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996).
18. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
19. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
20. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
21. 42 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 97 Cosmetic Injuries § 8 (2010)
(discussing bleaching creams).
22. See generally Angela Mae Kupenda, Loss of Innocence, in LAW TOUCHED
OUR HEARTs 36 (Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009).
23. I am ashamed to admit that I used these chemical creams to try to lighten
4032012]
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effects are quite dramatic on such fragile, bleached skin, and the true
complexion reemerged. In my eleventh grade pictures, my skin was
darker than ever. Ultimately, by my senior year, after more attempts to
whiten or bleach myself, my skin was damaged2 4 and became even
darker than when I started this process. 2 5 So, bleaching delays the
inevitable and results in a more flawed version than if the natural
darkened complexion was allowed to just exist.26
This same damage to complexion occurs in America's
borderlands. In America, as a nation of color, it takes great legal
resources and tension, to prevent the visibility of the actual color that
it has. These acts ultimately lead to desolation and damage of our
society just as the use of bleaching creams bring desolation and
damage to the skin. And, like a face that uses bleaching cream, once
the daily application of the cream ceases, the color will return to its
naturally darker state, and become damaged from the failed attempt to
bleach it into whiteness. The constant struggle to maintain the
artificial whiteness creates a damaged and desolate place of push and
pushback, and never growth, productivity, or beauty. Thus, the
constant struggle to maintain an artificially white America is futile and
leads to much damage to the structure, health, and face of America.
II. A SIMPLER ROLE FOR THE LAW: (RE)COMPLEXIONING
We should resist the artificial bleaching agents. We should allow,
and actually encourage, the natural (re)complexioning or coloring of
America and of the law to reflect the beautiful coloring present in the
my complexion. As a young person growing up in Mississippi, I regarded myself as
culturally aware and justice oriented. Still, I succumbed in the early seventies to the
prevalent message that lightness of complexion was a major path to be recognized
by Blacks and by Whites for having Black female beauty.
24. See Roseann B. Termini & Leah Tressler, American Beauty: An Analytical
View of the Past and Current Effectiveness of Cosmetics Safety Regulations and
Future Direction, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 257, 267 (2008) (bleaching creams change
the structure of one's skin).
25. Unfortunately, these creams are still promoted today, even in some of the
Black magazines. Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47
UCLA L. REv. 1705, 1737 & n.144 (2000).
26. Imani Perry, Buying White Beauty, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579, 579-
81 (2006) (discussing other harmful effects to the skin). Bleaching creams contribute
to caste systems based on color. Id. at 588-90.
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land. This (re)complexioning is a natural progression and it is
essential to allow this necessary (re)complexioning of the law to
reflect the natural (re)complexioning of our society. This is critical,
especially given the election of the first Black president, and with
other nonwhite-male presidents likely to follow.
Currently, the country is preparing for the upcoming presidential
elections in 2012. While I hope for the re-election of President Barack
Obama for a second term, the relevance of this Essay does not turn on
his re-election. The fact that a nonwhite person was elected in 2008,
signals a darker face of America; after all, the president is the face of
America on the international stage. His election signals the possibility
that other minorities including White women, women of color, and
more nonwhite men can also become the face for a complexioned
America. Perhaps it is this possibility that leads some to apply the
artificial bleaching creams to our legal system with even more vigor.
The thesis of this Essay is that many of our outdated, bleached
white legal norms do not contemplate the necessary and natural
(re)complexioning of the law. This Essay urges for one such
(re)complexioning from our now simple tale of race, hate speech, and
colored leadership. The type of (re)complexioning that I urge, though,
is opposite to the bleaching cream induced, artificial whitening noted
above. The law must logically and naturally allow the
(re)complexioning itself, even where White dominance is pushing for
an opposite outcome. The law's (re)complexioning here is critical for
our country's security and survival.
This Essay focuses on one aspect of the law where this is
critical-in the area of hate speech. Some of the Court's bleached
rulings on hate speech do not anticipate that our country could ever
have a Black president. Its rulings seem to contemplate that, as stated
by the Plessy dissent, the White race will dominate America "for all
time." Given that America actually did elect a Black president in
2008, it is critical for the law to (re)complexion itself to reflect the
factual reality of our times and to protect the country's security.
III. (RE)COMPLEXIONING THE LAW OF HATE SPEECH
President Obama has been subjected to many threats and blatantly
racist hate speech. Even his beautiful family has been subjected to the
ignorance of others who, rather than engage in political debates about
2012] 405
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policies, choose race based attacks against the president and his
family. These verbal assaults cause many to fear for the safety and
well being of the president.
Rampant racist hate speech in America not only poses a threat to
our president, it also poses a threat to the sacred Office of the
President, and to the country itself. Instead of remaining in a
borderland of artificially induced, bleached, pushback against the
browning of the Office of the President and of the face of America
itself, the Court should allow its complexion to naturally color by
acknowledging, rather than fighting this browning. This
acknowledgement must occur in the Court's dealings with the
principles of race and hate speech. This (re)complexioning is a simple
tale and a simple process, unlike the complicated and futile process of
artificial bleaching.
A. Racist Fighting Words Would Have Been "More" Unprotected,
but for the Court's Past Artificial Use ofBleaching Cream
Some who use racist speech to disrespect the president, the Office
of the President, and hence the country, mistakenly believe their
attempts to denigrate the coloring of American leadership through
insult is protected by the First Amendment. Yes, the First Amendment
protects the freedom of expression. However, few Justices of the
United States Supreme Court have insisted the First Amendment
accords absolute protection for speech.27 Most Justices, past and
present, insist speech rights must be balanced against other interests,
and at times other interests prevail over speech.
In spite of these other interests, generally pure speech is protected
from content regulation by the government. The Court has stated that
if the First Amendment means anything, it means the government
cannot tell citizens what is the proper way to think or speak.28
Ordinarily, pure speech is protected from content regulation, meaning
the government must satisfy strict scrutiny in order to regulate the
content of pure speech.29 Under strict scrutiny, the government must
27. But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for fuller protections of speech).
28. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(protecting rights of public school students who refused to salute the American flag).
29. Some scholars have argued racial hate speech should not be protected
406 [Vol. 48
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have a compelling interest and its restrictions must be narrowly
tailored to that interest in order to disfavor one individual's message
or to punish an individual for a given speech or message. 30
However, the Supreme Court has deemed some speech unworthy
of this great protection. Some speech has only slight value and could
bring great harm if the government is not allowed to regulate it. The
Court has ruled that other interests of society outweigh the importance
of fully protecting or allowing that speech. For example, the Court has
held that because of interests in protecting the moral fiber of society,
obscenity is unprotected speech which the government may regulate
as long as it has some rational basis, that is, that the government
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.31
This legitimate government interest could be connected to health,
safety, or even morals. The Court has also balanced reputational
interests against speech, holding that defamation is unprotected
speech.32
Hate speech has been examined as defamatory speech against
minorities. 33 However, hate speech fits more closely with the
unprotected categories of speech advocating illegal action or fighting
words. The Supreme Court regards speech advocating illegal action 34
and fighting words 35 as unprotected categories of speech. In other
words, both categories have been regarded as unprotected speech,
under strict scrutiny, but under a lower intermediate level of review. See, e.g., David
0. Brink, Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech, 7 LEGAL
THEORY 119, 143 (2001).
30. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
31. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court defined how to
determine if speech is unprotected obscenity in Miller. Id. The Court went further in
a subsequent case and held that certain non-obscene, but pornographic depictions of
children are also unprotected, thus may be regulated more freely by the government
to protect children. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
32. The Court allows for less regulation, though, of potentially defamatory
speech about public officials, or even public figures, to allow for robust debate. N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. See Beuhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
34. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
35. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
2012] 407
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which the government can regulate freely as long as it has some
rational basis.36
One would think hate-filled speech, especially hate-filled speech
directed against groups that do not make up the formerly White
political majority in this country, would be regarded as speech
advocating illegal action against certain groups and against racial
equality. One would also think such hate-filled speech would be
regarded as fighting words: words that would make an ordinary man
want to fight. 37 It seems, though, that the Court has complexioned the
ordinary man as White, while insisting that those of darker
complexions should develop thicker skins.38
The Court has hesitated in allowing the government to rationally
regulate such speech to further interests of safety for colored groups,
and to further notions of an America based on racial equality for all of
us. This has been the case with the Court seemingly making it harder
to show speech unlawfully advocated illegal action in a case where the
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) uttered hateful words. 39 Also, the Court,
bleaching white its premises, has ignored the harmful effects of
racially hateful speech directed to minorities, 4 0 even when trying to
obtain equal education on college campuses.41
A case that illustrates the Court's bleaching of the law is Virginia
v. Black,42 where two KKK-like crosses were burned. One was burned
on private property with the White property owner's consent, but in
view of a public highway.' 3 The other was burned on private property
36. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504-05 (1984).
37. Cf Camille A. Nelson, Breaking the Camel's Back: A Consideration of
Mitigatory Criminal Defenses and Racism-Related Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 77 (2003) (discussing effects of hate speech and racism on victims of color).
38. For documented examples, see Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431 (1990).
39. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
40. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 157 (1982).
41. See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 168-70 & n.i (2008) (citing authorities discussing the harmful effect of
hate speech).
42. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
43. Id. at 349.
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without the Black property owner's consent.44 The cross burners were
convicted under a state statute where burning a cross created a
rebuttable presumption of the intent to intimidate.45 The Court held
that statute unconstitutional.46
The Court suggested cross burning is protected speech unless
burned with the intent to intimidate. The statute provided that cross
burning created a presumption of intent to intimidate, a presumption
that was rebuttable by criminal defendants.47 The Court, however,
thought a statute with such a presumption unconstitutional, with the
White Justices thinking that such a KKK-like cross could be burned
without the intent to intimidate. This was indeed a heavy application
of bleaching cream to basic theories of First Amendment law.
The only Black Justice on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, did
not submit to this whitened approach this time, though. Justice
Thomas wrote a spirited and passionate dissent, which none of the
White Justices joined. 48 Even prior to writing his dissent, Justice
Thomas, who does not usually speak up during oral arguments, spoke
with great passion during oral argument about the harm the Klan
wrought on Blacks and the venomous effect of such cross burnings.49
Paraphrasing his written dissent that he read from the bench,
Justice Thomas called out the other Justices on how they were
artificially whitening the circumstances to bleach out the troubling
issues of race in our society. Justice Thomas argued that the other
Justices, the White ones, did not understand the terror caused in a
nonwhite family by having a KKK cross burned, and burned in their
yard.50 Justice Thomas does not consistently vote in a similar vein to
the racially aware voting patterns of the first Black Supreme Court
Justice, the late Justice Thurgood Marshall."' Yet, in Virginia v. Black,
44. Id. at 350.
45. Id. at 348.
46. Id. at 364, 367.
47. Id. at 395-400.
48. Id. at 388.
49. Thomas B. Metzloff, The Constitution and the Klan: Understanding the
Burning Cross in Virginia v. Barry Black, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 347, 362-63
(Myriam E. Giles & Risa L. Goluboff, eds., 2008).
50. Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
51. For example, Justice Thomas opposed the affirmative action or diversity
initiatives in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas was adamant that the Court did not understand terror
in the way that one with a complexion similar to the Black family
would, someone who in our society may be subjected to racial
assaults.52 It seems Justice Thomas was arguing the Court could
perform this bleaching in its opinion, but it does not change the reality
in a complexioned America.
To paraphrase Justice Thomas, realizing how terrible the effects
of cross burnings are, must be beyond the understanding of the White
Justices, and such an understanding must be a Black thing. Justice
Thomas stated, "[i]n every culture things acquire meaning well
beyond what outsiders can comprehend. That goes for both the sacred
and the profane. I believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic
example of the latter." 3
So the question is: Why is racial hate speech not considered
unprotected speech like some other forms of injurious speech that has
slight if any value? Why does the Court prevent the government from
acting in the interests of the people, when it wants to protect
nonwhites from vicious White attacks that, as Justice Thomas said,
cause terror in those to whom the speech is directed against?
The only answer this author has is that here, Justice Thomas is
correct. And, as other legal scholars agree, the predominantly White
Court has not seen racial hate speech as speech that is a major
problem for the average American, the average White American.54
Not only does the majority of the Court not feel the terror of racist
speech and symbols, the majority of the Court also minimizes the
extent of racist propaganda and disassociates itself and the legal
system from having any responsibility to address it, as they are not
members of the nonwhite groups targeted by such terror." The
predominantly White Court, thus, bleaches America and its racial
realities to promote a view that color doesn't impact the average
American. That the color of America is white, and when the laws
suggest that other complexions are to be incorporated, the Court
52. 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2326-27 (1989).
55. See, e.g., id.
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dismisses the issue, forcing America back into a borderland of push
and pushback.
Racial hate speech not only causes terror, it also suggests
continued inequality based on color. Interestingly, efforts to achieve
equality and to enact hate speech regulations to ensure equality and
freedom from domestic terror in the form of racist speech may be read
by "many millions of Americans. . . [as] yet another law exhibiting
special favoritism for people of color."56
If, however, racial hate speech implicates the average White
American too, then the Court's prior determinations, hopefully,
become outdated, and the effects of the bleaching cream will fade, as
we forge a more just society, free of racism and the accompanying
terror. Maybe then the law, rather than being bleached white, will
(re)complexion and will naturally reflect the colored complexions of
America.
At the LatCrit conference, many of us were in shock and in a
place of deep sadness after the passing of Professor Derrick Bell-a
great legal scholar, teacher, activist, and friend to us all. We grieved
the passing of Professor Bell as we simultaneously celebrated the
tremendous impact of his work. One of the important theories he
forged was the convergence interest theory. Professor Bell argued that
Whites will support racial equality when their interests converge with
those of racial minorities.5 7 He also argued that once this convergence
ends, Whites cease to support racial equality." In other words, when
White dominance is threatened, Whites as a group no longer seek
racial equality. 59
So, this author must discover how the bleached white legal
structures in America can be persuaded that naturally
(re)complexioned legal rules related to hate speech are in the best
interests of all Americans. The election of a Black president forces
this convergence of interest of certain legal precepts as will be
discussed below.
56. Steven Shriffin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning
ofAmerica, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 96-103 (1994).
57. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
58. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of
Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2005).
59. Id. at 1059.
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B. A More Reality Complexioned Revisiting of R.A. V. v. St. Paul
Coupled with the Election of a Black President Suggest a
Convergence ofInterests of the Complexioned with
Those of Whiter America.
The convergence of interests of the complexioned with those of
whiter America is made more visible through the study of the case of
R.A. V v. St. Paul,60 where several Whites burned a cross during the
predawn hours in the fenced-in yard of a Black family. The White
defendants were arrested and charged under an ordinance designed by
the city to punish offenses motivated by impermissible bias.61
Ultimately the Court held the ordinance unconstitutional, setting the
cross burners free. 62 Essentially the Court held that, although fighting
words are unprotected speech, the city could not discriminate among
the types of content it would regulate in this way.
Several Justices complained that the majority was creating a new
principle. This author thinks the Court's holding urges a bleached
principle. In past cases, the Court held that unprotected speech could
be regulated as long as the government had a rational basis. And, here
there was certainly a rational basis to regulate such abhorrent bias
offenses. This opinion is indeed confusing. A cynical view of the
opinion is that the Court did not take this apprehensible crime
seriously. In the beginning of the Court's opinion it referred to the
defendants as "teenagers," 63 suggesting White teenagers carrying out a
prank, as opposed to considering the terror imposed on this Black
family. A bleached view of race based attacks is that they cause no
special harm to others.
In spite of these concerns about the opinion, two statements of the
Court are most important to this Essay. First, although the Court
strikes down the bias punishing statute as unconstitutional, the Court
announces a number of exceptions to its holding. One of the
exceptions the Court notes is "the Federal Government can
60. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
61. Id. at 379-81.
62. Id. at 395-96.
63. Id. at 379 (the Court described the scene as, "petitioner and several other
teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross").
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criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the
President ... since the reason why threats of violence are outside the
First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to
the person of the President."64
The Court acknowledged additional steps could be taken to
protect the president from threats that instill fear, cause disruption
from fear, or create possibilities of actual violence directed against the
president. When the Court issued this opinion, America had never had
a Black president. The Court's next point becomes even more
perplexing, given that President Obama, compared to other presidents,
has had an incessant number of threats against him.65
The Court said, "[b]ut the Federal Government may not
criminalize only those threats against the president that mention his
policy on aid to inner cities." 66 The Court does not say the Federal
Government may not criminalize threats against the president that
only implicate his race.
Many of the hate messages against the president do implicate
race, so the next logical step in the Court's reasoning is that the
Federal Government may criminalize racist speech in its attempts to
protect the president, who is Black. An environment of hate messages
against Blacks necessarily includes the president. And an environment
of hate directed against the president focusing on the president's race
necessarily includes all Americans of color.
Moreover, threats and hate directed against the president because
of his race, disrespect the honored Office of the President, and
disrespect America. Those Americans launching such racist attacks
embarrass America abroad.
African Americans and other people of color have been the targets
of and subjected to much of the hate speech in America's history. Yet,
64. Id. at 388 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
65. See Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and
Social Equity Rationale, 42 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 588 n.10 (2011); Joel Wm.
Friedman, The Impact of the Obama Presidency on Civil Rights Enforcement in the
United States, 87 IND. L.J. 349, 351 (2012); Gregory S. Parks & Danielle C. Heard,
"Assassinate the Nigger Ape[] ": Obama, Implicit Imagery, and the Dire
Consequences ofRacist Jokes, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 259, 260-62 (2010).
66. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388.
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the impact of such injurious words and depictions has been
bleached-underestimated and deemphasized-even by the United
States Supreme Court.67 The Court has bleached the impact on
nonwhites from its rulings. The Court has actually gone so far as to
suggest the government cannot, without meeting a high showing,
single out nonwhites for protections from hate speech.68 Such rulings
seem contrary to earlier rulings of the Court, which allow the
government to protect people from certain categories of speech, such
as fighting words and obscenity, as long as those governmental
protections are rational.
The Court's ignoring of the harm of hate speech to African
Americans and other nonwhite groups is problematic. The election of
an African American president, however, makes these rulings even
more problematic. This election, the resulting hateful speech about
Blacks as some individuals lament having a Black president, coupled
with the Court's apparent tolerance for racist hate speech, all together
create a challenging predicament for the entire country.
The Court's past rulings ignore the harm racist speech causes to
Black Americans. It follows then, that the Court's rulings also ignore
the harm racist speech causes to a Black president. Hence, the Court's
rulings now ignore the denigration to the country, the Office of
President, and all those similarly colored by allowing, essentially
unchecked, continued hate and racist speech.
If the law finds it acceptable for the Office of the President to be
demeaned racially, the insult is not just an insult directed at the
president or his family; the insult is also an insult directed at those of
the same color. Moreover, the racial insult is also an insult directed at
the once predominantly White country he commands as commander in
chief.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hate speech unchecked against Blacks, with a Black president in
office, magnifies the effect of hate speech on the country. These
rulings must be (re)complexioned, as unchecked hate speech places
67. See generally JABARI AslM, THE N WORD (2007).
68. See, e.g., R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 377 (striking down as unconstitutional a hate
speech ordinance that would have punished defendants for burning cross inside
fenced yard of a Black family).
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the Office of the President, and the condition of those similarly
colored, in even greater peril. Thus, without change, the country
experiences a magnified impact of hate speech that could reign to the
great detriment of the entire country. Hence, interests converge.
Every racial onslaught against the president who is Black, and the
news and internet attests to many such onslaughts, are racial
onslaughts against Black Americans and other Americans of color.
The impact is not only magnified for those who are not of the majority
race. The negative impact of racial onslaughts against the president is
magnified and affects all Americans, and the image of America
domestically and abroad.
In the past, the primarily-White Court seemed detached from
racist hate speech, viewing it as a problem for racial minorities that
are too sensitive, and not a problem for the White majority of
Americans. Now, though, with this hate speech being directed at the
top executive officer, the Court must revisit its nonchalant, bleached
holdings about the injuries of cross burnings and other forms of hate
speech.
In other words, if the Court's bleached rulings sanction the
acceptability for the president to be labeled by citizens as [a racial
slur], then does it follow that all of America is [a racial slur] or is the
country following the lead of [a racial slur]? Today, hate speech does
not just injure people of color; hate speech injures all of America and
its image abroad, which the Court may ultimately more fully
understand.
Denigration of the president as being lesser by his complexion
compromises national integrity, national security, and the ability of
the country to operate in the foreign arena. If the president's face is
compromised, not by legitimate disagreement, but by racial
demoralization, then so is the country. The Court in Grutter was
correct when it said cultural understanding was critical to the
country's defense. 69 Greater cultural understanding could lift people
out of borderlands by helping the resistance to this natural browning
of America see that their resistance and hate speech is the real threat
to America, rather than the (re)complexioning itself.
This necessity for the law's (re)complexioning continues even if
the Office of the President is not held by a person of color. It is
69. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
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necessary because a person of color, a White female, or any person
who challenges what is regarded as the norm or dominance of
America could hold the Office of the President. Such
(re)complexioning of the high office remains an even more viable
option now that America elected a Black president.
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